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This paper examines the investment preferences of foreign insti-
tutional investors investing in the U.S. market. We analyse both
ﬁrm and country-level determinants that inﬂuence the foreign
institutional investors’ allocation choices. At the country level, we
ﬁnd that the governance quality in a foreign institutional investor’s
home country is a determinant of their decision to invest in the
U.S. market. Our ﬁndings indicate that investors who come from
countries with governance setups similar to that of the U.S. invest
more in the United States. The investment levels though, are more
pronounced for countries with governance setups just below that
of the U.S. Our results are consistent with both the ‘ﬂight to quality’
and ‘familiarity’ arguments, and help reconcile prior contradictory
empirical evidence. At the ﬁrm level, we present unequivocal
evidence in favour of the familiarity argument. Foreign institu-
tional investors domiciled in countries with high governance
quality prefer to invest in U.S. ﬁrms with high corporate gover-
nance quality. This effect is primarily driven by grey (non-moni-
toring) institutional investors.
 2012 Elsevier Ltd. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Recent studies highlight the importance of home country characteristics in determining the target
country investment preferences of foreign investors. Kim et al. (2011) show that foreign investorsfax: þ90 266 7380946.
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ﬁrms, that is, they prefer familiar stocks. They also argue that foreign investors from low corporate
governance quality home countries are indifferent to the level of corporate governance in the target
country. In contrast, Forbes (2010) argues that a primary factor of foreign investment in the U.S. is the
desire of foreign investors from less developed ﬁnancial markets to invest in a developed market. That
is, her conclusions support the ﬂight to quality argument. Using a unique research design, which
utilizes the distance of governance quality between home and target countries, this study reconciles
prior evidence by illustrating that both the ﬂight to quality and familiarity arguments can hold. Our
country-level results on foreign investment in the U.S. capital markets suggest that the two effects, i.e.,
familiarity and ﬂight to quality, are complimentary and not substitutes. We also investigate the ﬁrm-
level investment preferences of foreign investors in the U.S. and relate them to home country gover-
nance. Our ﬁrm-level evidence supports the familiarity effect; we show that this is mainly due to the
information asymmetry costs of foreign institutional investors. Overall, this paper provides new
evidence on the interplay between the ﬂight to quality and familiarity effects and extends the existing
literature on the importance of home country governance as a determinant of foreign investment
allocations.
Investors allocate only a small fraction of their wealth to foreign markets, a practice typically
referred to as the ‘home bias puzzle’ (Tesar and Werner, 1995). Kang and Stulz (1997) identify some
explicit and implicit barriers that explain the home bias puzzle.1 Information asymmetry is one of the
important barriers that foreign investors encounter when they invest abroad. Since the foreign
investors have an informational disadvantage relative to local investors, the cost of investing abroad is
high for them and it is this cost that prevents them from investing in foreignmarkets.2 However, recent
trends document an increase in foreign investment as a result of globalisation. With globalisation,
foreign capital has become an important source of ﬁnance in many capital markets and foreign
investors have started to allocate more of their money abroad (Leuz et al., 2009 and Bekaert et al.,
2002).
Over the last decade, equity ownership by foreign institutional investors in U.S. ﬁrms has almost
doubled in size. In 1999, nearly 4% of the equity in S&P 1500 ﬁrms3 was in the hands of foreign
institutional investors. This had increased to 8% by 2008. According to the 2008 U.S. Treasury report on
institutional holdings, $2.969 trillion worth of capital is in the hands of foreign institutional investors.
This substantial and growing foreign investment in the U.S. motivates us to investigate the determi-
nants of foreign investment. The fact that most of it is channelled through institutional investors
justiﬁes the research focus of this paper.
Although foreign institutional investors have grown in size and importance in the U.S. market, most
of the academic studies on institutional ownership focus on aspects of U.S. institutional investment,
either within the U.S. or abroad with almost no attention being paid to foreign institutional investment
in the United States. Further, studies that focus on the determinants of institutional ownership have
always considered ﬁrm-speciﬁc variables, such as ﬁnancial performance, liquidity, size, volatility and
corporate governance setups (for example see Dahlquist and Robertsson, 2001; Almazan et al., 2005
and Li et al., 2006). It is only recently that the role of country-level governance quality has been the
focus of attention.4
In this paper, we examine the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors investing in
U.S. ﬁrms and investigate the role of country-level governance quality on their investment preferences.
Speciﬁcally, we address two important research questions: First, does the governance quality of the
home country5 play any role in the foreign institutional investor’s decision to invest in the U.S? Second,1 One explicit barrier is the constraint on foreign exchange transactions. Political risk and information asymmetry differences
between foreign and domestic investors are examples of implicit barriers.
2 Several studies, such as Brennan and Cao (1997), Kang and Stulz (1997), report the information disadvantage of foreign
investors relative to domestic investors. Dvorak (2003) also discusses the information asymmetry between foreign and
domestic investors.
3 S&P Composite 1500 covers approximately 85% of the U.S. market capitalisation.
4 Notable examples are the studies by Kim et al. (2011) and Forbes (2010); we refer to these papers in detail below.
5 Home country is the foreign institutional investors’ country of domicile.
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U.S. ﬁrms?
So far, the existing literature ﬁnds that, in order to avoid high levels of investment costs, foreign
institutional investors place importance on the country-level governance quality of the countries they
invest in (Li et al., 2006 and Leuz et al., 2009). However, in this paper we argue that the governance
quality of the foreign institutional investors’ own countries affects their investment preferences as
well. If they have low-quality governance at home, their costs when investing at home might be much
higher than the costs they bear when investing abroad. This trades off the information asymmetry
costs associated with foreign investment. In line with the ‘good country bias’ theory of Giannetti and
Koskinen (2010), we argue that weak investor protection, low information disclosure and, therefore,
high information asymmetry result from low-quality governance in a country. Thus, institutional
investors who are domiciled in a country with weak investor protection are inclined to invest in foreign
countries that provide higher-quality corporate governance than their home country. As a result,
a good country bias is seen in the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors. Putting this
in a different way, we expect to see a pronounced effect of ﬂight to quality in the investment behaviour
of foreign institutional investors who have lower governance quality at home than exists in the United
States. Still, one should acknowledge the possibility of higher institutional investment levels from
countries with similar (therefore, even just above that of the U.S.) levels of governance quality. Based on
the familiarity argument (Chan et al., 2005), institutional investors prefer the familiar to the unfamiliar,
since the former allows them to reduce the costs associated with investment uncertainty and ‘prudent
man rule’mandates. Therefore, we argue that both biases, ﬂight to quality and familiarity, affect foreign
institutional investment preferences in the U.S. market. Our argument allows for heterogeneity in the
investment preferences of foreign institutional investors based on the relative distance in governance
quality between the U.S. and the home country.
Furthermore, although prior studies (i.e., Ferreira and Matos, 2008; Kang and Stulz, 1997) have
examined the relation between foreign institutional investment and ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics, they
have not investigated whether this relation depends on the home country’s governance quality. We
argue that foreigners do not have homogeneous preferences when choosing the ﬁrms they invest in.
Foreign institutional investors who have low information asymmetry at home (high governance
quality) invest in low information asymmetry U.S. stocks (high corporate governance quality stocks).
This prediction is In line with the familiarity argument. Foreign institutional investors look for
familiarity in stock characteristics when they invest abroad, because familiarity will reduce the
information costs and, as a result, the home bias will decrease. We proxy familiarity with the similarity
between the level of information asymmetry a foreign investor is exposed to at home and the level they
experience in the target ﬁrm.6
We ﬁnd that foreign institutional investors who have low governance quality at home invest more
in the U.S. market. To our knowledge, our study is among the ﬁrst in the literature to focus on home
country governance quality as a determinant of foreign institutional investment preferences. In
addition, we examine differences in the choices of institutional investors, based on the different levels
of governance quality they experience at home. We split our sampled countries into those with
governance quality above and below that of the U.S. (the Above-U.S. and Below-U.S. groups) and thus
investigate separately foreign institutional investment from countries with higher and lower gover-
nance quality than the United States. Foreign institutional investors from countries with similar (just
above/below) governance quality to that of the U.S. invest more in the U.S. market. Thus, we also ﬁnd
support for the familiarity argument at the country level: the closer the foreign institutional investors
are to the U.S., in terms of the governance quality they experience at home, the more they invest in the
U.S. These ﬁndings suggest a complementary effect (instead of a substitution one) between the
familiarity and ﬂight to quality arguments. This is the ﬁrst study that reports this complementary
effect, thus extending recent papers in this area (Kim et al., 2011; Forbes, 2010).6 The literature uses several proxies for familiarity. We present some of them in Section 3.
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high governance quality invest in U.S. ﬁrms with good corporate governance systems. Thus, the home
country’s level of governance affects the investor’s portfolio choices abroad. We argue that the
familiarity bias holds even for ﬁrm-level preferences. Our results also indicate that this effect is driven
by grey investors, who do not actively monitor the management teams of the ﬁrms they invest in, and
therefore have the most to gain from a reduction in information asymmetry. The distinction of this
effect between grey (non-monitoring) and independent (monitoring) investors is more pronounced for
non-U.K. foreign investors.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide an overview of the literature
on the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors and highlight our contributions.
Section 3 presents our hypotheses. Our data and methodology follow in Section 4. Section 5 discusses
the empirical results. Section 6 presents our robustness tests. Section 7 provides our conclusions.2. Literature review
Prior empirical work that examines the investment preferences of foreign institutional investors
typically investigates the preferences of U.S. institutional investors when investing abroad. Leuz et al.
(2009) analyse the foreign holdings of U.S. investors and document that the typical U.S. investor invests
less in countries with weak legal institutions and poor information frameworks. Aggarwal et al. (2005)
examine the investment choices of U.S. mutual funds in emerging markets. They ﬁnd that strong
accounting standards, shareholder rights and legal frameworks attract more U.S. investment. Ferreira
andMatos (2008) also ﬁnd that foreign institutional investors invest more in countries that have strong
governance systems. Analysing the equity holdings of mutual funds from 26 developed countries, Chan
et al. (2005) report that high levels of foreign institutional investment are expected in countries with
low expropriation risk. Li et al. (2006) use the degree of enforcement of shareholder rights as a proxy
for a country’s governance quality. They ﬁnd a positive association between the degree of enforcement
and foreign institutional investment. Finally, Gelos and Wei (2005) ﬁnd that international institutional
investors invest in more transparent markets.8
All the above papers examine the effect of the governance quality of the countries in which the
institutional investors are investing (target country) and establish a signiﬁcant link with foreign
investment levels (capital inﬂows). However, we argue that foreign institutional investment prefer-
ences are not homogeneous with regard to country-level governance quality. By examining the
differences between the home country’s governance quality and a benchmark, i.e., the level of
governance in the U.S., we study the sources and impact of this heterogeneity. Our research design
allows us to examine the impact of each country’s governance quality (home country) on the level of
foreign investment in the U.S. by institutional investors domiciled in that country (capital outﬂows).
Two recent papers investigate foreign investment in the U.S. market. Cai andWarnock (2006) study the
security-level investment preferences of foreign and domestic institutional investors in the United
States. They identify a preference of institutional investors for domestic multinationals. They argue that
this is a safe way of achieving international diversiﬁcation. The scope and focus of our paper are
different. In particular, we relate investment preferences to home governance quality and investigate
the investment patterns of foreign institutional investors both at the country and ﬁrm levels. We ﬁnd
that the heterogeneity in countries’ governance quality around the globe explains the investment
choices in the U.S. market.
The paper closest to this study is that of Forbes (2010). She studies the level of foreign investment
in the U.S. and concludes that foreign investors hold a greater amount of their wealth in the United
States, if they have a less developed ﬁnancial market at home. There are signiﬁcant differences
between our study and that of Forbes (2010). Forbes (2010) studies the holdings of all types of7 Our study documents that the majority of foreign investment in S&P 1500 ﬁrms comes from U.K. institutional investors.
Throughout our analysis we report the sensitivity of our results to the exclusion of holdings by foreign investors domiciled in
the United Kingdom.
8 La Porta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000) also examine the effect of country-level governance quality on investment decisions.
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on private institutional investment; we expect market-based considerations, e.g., governance
quality, to be the main driver of the decision making of this group of informed investors. Political,
and other non-market based, inﬂuences are expected to carry less weight in the investment choices
of this group. Also, Forbes (2010) investigates foreign holdings in both the equity and debt markets.
There are substantial differences in the proﬁles of investments in equities and liabilities, e.g., risk
characteristics and exposure, investment horizon, investor types. To avoid capturing systematic
differences in the investor proﬁles, which might affect our results in unpredictable ways, we focus
only on the equity markets. In addition, our research design helps us to explore the heterogeneity in
the governance quality of countries with substantially different proﬁles to that of the United States.
Our ﬁndings on the co-existence of the ﬂight to quality and familiarity biases extend those provided
by Forbes (2010) and help us to reconcile the conﬂicting evidence she offers with that of other
studies (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2005). Finally, but equally importantly, we also provide security-level
analyses, which highlight the importance of governance quality at home for the ﬁrm-level invest-
ment preferences of foreign investors, which Forbes (2010) does not consider; we turn to this
literature below.
The literature examines the effect of ﬁrm-level governance quality on foreign institutional
investment, without taking into account the effect of the home country’s governance quality. The
deﬁnition of ‘good governance’ varies between studies.9 Kang and Stulz (1997), Ahearne et al. (2004),
Edison and Warnock (2004) and Aggarwal et al. (2005) use the ADR (American Depository Receipt)
issuance as a proxy for strong shareholder rights, or a reduction in asymmetric information, for
foreign ﬁrms and ﬁnd that ﬁrms with ADR issuance have high levels of U.S. ownership. Leuz et al.
(2009) also conclude that U.S. institutional investors invest less in foreign stocks with high infor-
mation asymmetry and high monitoring costs. Furthermore, Giannetti and Simonov (2006) show, for
the Swedish market, that foreigners invest less in ﬁrms with high levels of outside investor
expropriation.10
A recent study by Kim et al. (2011) ﬁnds that if an investor’s country has a low level of disparity
between ownership and control, the investor does not invest in high-disparity ﬁrms in the Korean
market. Our study is different to that of Kim et al. (2011) in the following ways: First, Kim et al. (2011)
use the disparity between control and ownership as their proxy for corporate governance risk, hence
concentrating on the risk of tunnelling by controlling shareholders. We capture the country-level
governance quality using the World Bank KKM (Kaufmann et al., 2007) indicators. These six key
indicators provide a more holistic representation of a country’s governance level.11 Second, Kim et al.
examine the behaviour of all investors, retail and institutional. We concentrate on institutional
investors since they are informed, highly-skilled traders, and therefore our conjectures on their
investment preferences, based on the governance quality at home and abroad (the processing of which
information requires expert knowledge and tools), appear more robust. Third, Kim et al. examine the
investment preferences of foreign investors in an emerging market, i.e., Korea; it is unclear what the
foreign investors’ perceptions of the overall governance quality of Korea are (thus it is unclear whether
this factor affects the heterogeneity of foreign investors investing in this country). However, we study
foreign investment in the U.S., which undoubtedly has a strong corporate governance system, thus
allowing the maximum possible degree of investor heterogeneity. Finally, our research design helps us
to reconcile the results reported in Kim et al. (2011) with the conﬂicting evidence provided by prior
studies.9 McKinsey and Company (2002) report the following ranking in the investors’ governance priorities: strong shareholder
rights (for 33% of investors), good accounting standards (for 32% of investors), more effective disclosure (for 31% of investors),
and stronger enforcement (for 27% of investors).
10 Other studies examine the effect of ﬁrm-level accounting variables on institutional investment. For example, Dahlquist and
Robertsson (2001), Kang and Stulz (1997), Gompers and Metrick (2001), Falkenstein (1996), Ferreira and Matos (2008) and
Khurshed et al. (2011).
11 Beltratti and Stulz (2009) and Caprio et al. (2011) use the KKM measures as proxies for country-level governance quality.
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Domestic investors prefer to invest more in their local market than abroad. This ‘home bias puzzle’
(Lewis, 1999) is mainly attributed to the higher information asymmetry costs associated with investing
abroad. Given that domestic investors have more information about the domestic economy, foreign
investors suffer from adverse selection problems and require a premium in order to compete with
domestic investors. However, there is a considerable and growing amount of foreign institutional
investment in the United States (see Table 1). This indicates that the U.S. market offers investment
opportunities to foreign investors that can give them the required premium to compensate them for
their adverse selection problems. Given the recent high levels of foreign investment in the U.S., we
explore the factors that attract high level of foreign institutional investment to the U.S. market. We
argue that the level of investor protection is one of the most important factors in drawing foreign
investment to the United States.
Investor protection is deﬁned as “... the extent of the laws that protect investors’ rights and the
strength of the legal institutions that facilitate law enforcement” (Defond and Hung, 2004; p. 269). The
level of investor protection depends on the governance quality of a country. It is well-documented
in the literature that investors prefer to invest in countries with high-quality governance, and thus
a high level of investor protection, for example Aggarwal et al. (2011) and Leuz et al. (2009). Even if
a ﬁrm has good internal corporate governance, if it is domiciled in a country with weak governance
quality, it beneﬁts less from the domestic capital markets. It cannot reduce its cost of capital to the
level it would obtain if it was domiciled in a country with good governance (Doidge et al., 2007).
Firms cannot compensate for the absence of a high-quality governance environment. They can
improve the quality of their internal corporate governance quality but this cannot substitute for the
quality of legal rules (Klapper and Love, 2004). In line with this argument, we predict that one of the
most important determinants of institutional investment is the quality of the governance envi-
ronment. We expect the level of governance at home to affect the level of institutional investment
abroad, as investors try to identify better investment opportunities in a globalised environment.Table 1
Institutional ownership.
Variable 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Panel A: Foreign vs. Domestic ownership
TI 52% 54% 56% 59% 61% 65% 66% 69% 72% 70%
FI 4% 4% 5% 5% 3% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8%
DI 48% 46% 51% 54% 58% 58% 59% 61% 63% 61%
UNC – 4% – – – 1% – 1% 1% 1%
Panel B: Ownership by investor type
BANKS 13% 13% 13% 15% 14% 16% 16% 17% 16% 15%
INS 5% 5% 6% 5% 4% 5% 4% 4% 6% 4%
IA 31% 32% 33% 34% 37% 37% 39% 42% 42% 45%
PPS 2% 3% 3% 3% 3% 4% 3% 3% 4% 2%
OTHERS 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 3% 4% 3% 4% 4%
Total 52% 54% 56% 59% 61% 65% 66% 69% 72% 70%
This table presents descriptive statistics on institutional ownership. Panel A reports the fraction of shares held by foreign and
domestic institutional investors investing in the U.S. between 1999 and 2008. The investment levels are reported for the
constituent ﬁrms of the S&P 1500 index. Institutional ownership at the ﬁrm level is deﬁned as the sum of the institutional
investors’ holdings at ﬁscal year-end divided by total shares outstanding. TI is the level of total institutional investment in the
United States. FI is the investment level of foreign institutional investors investing in the United States. DI is the investment level
of domestic (U.S.) institutional investors. UNC is the investment level of institutional investors for which there is no information
on origin (cannot be classiﬁed). Panel B reports the level of investment in the U.S. by different types of institutional investors for
the period 1999–2008. BANKS is ownership by banks. INS is insurance companies. IA is investment advisors, i.e., investment
companies and independent investment advisors. PPS is public pension funds. OTHERS includes university and foundation
endowments, corporate pension funds and miscellaneous investors.
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hypothesis. We argue that institutional investors domiciled in countries with low levels of investor
protection, are inclined to seek investment opportunities in foreign countries that provide better
investor protection. This allows them to take advantage of the high-quality governance in better
protected economies and identify more cost-efﬁcient investments. The extent of this strategy
depends on how bad the home governance is compared to the level of governance in the target
country. In other words, we expect the ﬂight to quality of foreign institutional investors to vary
systematically with respect to the relative distance in governance quality between the home and
target countries.
The investigation of the relative distance between countries also allows us to test an alternative
argument based on the familiarity bias. This postulates that foreign investors prefer to invest more in
familiar environments since this helps them reduce their information asymmetry costs. Therefore, one
would expect foreign investors to invest more in countries with a similar level of governance quality to
that of their home country. The literature so far presents the familiarity and ﬂight to quality biases as
substitutes. The evidence produced supports either but not both. In this paper, we hypothesise that both
effects can co-exist; it is an empirical question whether the magnitude of either effect is more
pronounced.
Hypothesis 1a. If the governance quality of an investor’s country is lower than that of the U.S., the
investor will invest in the United States.
Hypothesis 1b. If the governance quality of an investor’s country is similar to that of the U.S., the
investor will invest in the United States.
We use the United States as the “benchmark” in order to investigate the importance of the differ-
ence between countries’ governance regimes. The U.S. economy provides a high standard of investor
protection and information disclosure, and thus can operate as an ideal benchmark, since it should
allow the greatest possible heterogeneity in foreign investor origins, i.e., several countries will be
represented.
As we mentioned above, one way of reducing the information asymmetry costs associated with
a foreign investment is by investing in familiar stocks abroad i.e., stocks that share characteristics
with ﬁrms at home. Merton (1987) documents that investors prefer to invest in stocks they have
information about. Chan et al. (2005) argue that foreign institutional investors aim at investing in
familiar stocks, since they can better process the available information for these ﬁrms. Also, given
that institutional investors are typically bound by “prudent man rules” (Del Guercio, 1996), they
need to invest in reliable assets. According to these rules, institutional investors have incentives to
protect themselves from liability by tilting their portfolios toward those assets that are easy to
defend in court. Therefore, understanding the structure, organisation, business activities, etc., of
a ﬁrm is vital to them. In line with the familiarity argument, foreign investors who experience high
governance quality at home are expected to invest more in U.S. stocks with high-quality corporate
governance.
Prior literature uses several deﬁnitions for familiarity. According to Kang and Stulz (1997), larger
and more internationally-known stocks are familiar stocks to foreign investors. Coval and Moskowitz
(1999) ﬁnd that geographical proximity to be an important factor for foreign mutual funds in identi-
fying familiar stocks. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) show common language and cultural background
as a reason for foreign investors to invest in Finland. We expect a ﬁrm to be familiar to a foreign
investor when the level of information asymmetry within the ﬁrm resembles the information asym-
metry level in the investor’s country of domicile.
We exploit the cross-sectional variation in the corporate governance quality of U.S. ﬁrms.We expect
foreign institutional investors who have a high quality of country-level governance quality at home to
invest in U.S. ﬁrms with high internal governance scores. Thus, we expect that the governance quality
in investors’ home countries affects their portfolio choices abroad.
Hypothesis 2. Foreign institutional investors who experience high governance quality in their home
countries prefer to invest in U.S. ﬁrms with high corporate governance quality.
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4.1. Data
We use the Thomson-Reuters Institutional Holdings database to collect data on foreign institutional
ownership from the 13F ﬁlings of U.S. ﬁrms for the period 1999–2008.12,13 We include all stocks listed
in the S&P1500 index, i.e., constituent ﬁrms of the S&P 500, S&P MidCap 400 and S&P SmallCap 600
indices; we exclude ADRs and foreign stocks. We identify more than three million investor-level
observations; foreign institutional investors originate from 18 countries.14 For every ﬁrm in our
sample, we aggregate the holdings of investors from the same countries, creating 77,697 country-level
observations.
For the accounting variables we use the Compustat North America database. Data for market
turnover is collected from CRSP. Corporate governance information, i.e., the directors’ index (DINDEX),
is collected from the director ﬁles of the Investor Responsibility Research Centre (IRRC), available
through the RiskMetrics database. Compustat, IRRC and CRSP provide the related ﬁrm-level data at
each ﬁscal year-end. The 13F ﬁlings report institutional investor holdings on a quarterly basis. We use
the institutional holdings reported for the last quarter of each ﬁscal year and merge these with the
other accounting and market data. Missing data on accounting variables and ﬁrm-level governance
indicators reduces our sample size to 59,491 observations.
We follow Beltratti and Stulz (2009) in using the average of the Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi
(KKM) governance indicators as a proxy for a country’s governance quality. The World Bank website
provides these indicators for each country in our sample for all related years.15 We collect additional
country-level turnover data from Datastream.
4.2. Variables
4.2.1. Country-level governance quality
Our main proxies for a country’s governance quality are the KKM governance quality indicators
as deﬁned by Kaufmann et al. (2007). We take the average of the six KKM indicators to create
a variable which captures the annual average governance quality of a country. These indicators
cover several dimensions of a country’s governance, related to the level of accountability and
freedom of speech, the efﬁciency and stability of the political system, the quality and independence12 The availability of information on the country of origin of institutional investors dictates our choice on start date for our
sample period, i.e., 1999.
13 There are two databases that provide large sample, ﬁrm-level institutional investor ownership details for U.S. listed ﬁrms.
These are the Thomson-Reuters 13F and Thomson One Banker databases. We follow the extensive literature on institutional
investment and use the 13F database as our data source. Thomson-Reuters 13F collects all the information contained in Form
13F ﬁled with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). U.S. law requires all institutional investors with $100m or more in
assets under management to ﬁle a 13F form with the SEC. Therefore, if a country is not represented in our sample, then this is
because of the following scenarios: (a) there is no institutional investment in S&P 1500 ﬁrms originating from this country; (b)
institutional investors originating from this country manage very small portfolios (less than $100m) so do not have to comply
with 13F rules. In that case their holdings are expected to be minimal and limited to a very small number of ﬁrms; (c) these
countries invest in U.S. equities through other special investment vehicles and not through institutional investors. We explain in
the main text why we believe that the investigation of institutional investment is ideal in our context. As a robustness check, we
have also collected institutional investor ownership details for a random sample of 300 ﬁrms listed in the S&P1500 index from
Thomson One Banker. We ﬁnd a similar number of countries represented in the sample as well as similar levels of foreign
investment across the years.
14 The majority of foreign investment in the U.S. originates from the United Kingdom, i.e., more than 50% in each year. We
provide annual information on country-level holdings in Appendix Table A.1.
15 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
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indicators capture, to varying degrees, the level of information asymmetry and uncertainty under
which investors operate in a country. For this reason, we attempt to isolate their joint effect by
calculating their average.
In our robustness checks, we alternatively deﬁne the level of governance in a country by the
turnover ratio of its main ﬁnancial market. The large literature on the relationship between law and
ﬁnance (e.g., La Porta et al., 1998) ﬁnds that better governed countries are associated with more
developed ﬁnancial markets. A proxy for the development and depth of a market is its liquidity,
typically measured through the dollar volume of shares traded in themarket over a given period, scaled
by its market capitalisation, i.e., turnover ratio. To calculate the turnover ratio for all the countries in
our sample, we collect the appropriate variables from Datastream.17We also collect information on the
holdings of U.S. institutional investors abroad and use this to classify our countries. High levels of U.S.
investment are associated with more developed foreign ﬁnancial markets. We retrieve the relevant
data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports.
4.2.2. Firm-level variables
We follow the extant literature, in particular Ferreira and Matos (2008), Dahlquist and Robertsson
(2001) and Bushee et al. (2010), to identify and deﬁne the relevant ﬁrm-level variables:
(i) Firm Size (SIZE): We take the logarithm of the ﬁscal year-end market value of equity as a proxy for
ﬁrm size (Compustat item: MKVLT). Prior studies mainly report a positive relation between ﬁrm
size and institutional ownership. For example, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) agree with
Merton (1987) and Huberman (2001), who argue that investors prefer ﬁrms which are morewell-
known and with which they are familiar, and ﬁnd a signiﬁcant positive relationship between ﬁrm
size and investor ownership. This positive relationship between size and institutional ownership
is consistent with the results of Badrinath et al. (1989), Cready (1994), Falkenstein (1996), and
Bennett et al. (2003) for U.S. ﬁrms. In contrast, Hussain (2000) ﬁnds that institutional investors in
the U.K. prefer to invest in smaller and riskier ﬁrms. In addition, Bennett et al. (2003) ﬁnd that
institutional investors appear to have recently changed their preferences in favour of smaller and
riskier securities since these stocks provide an opportunity for institutional investors to exploit
their informational advantages.
(ii) Book-to-Market Ratio (BM):We use the logarithm of the ratio of the book value of common equity
outstanding (Compustat item: CEQ) to the market value of equity, to calculate BM. BM is used to
differentiate between value and growth stocks. High and low values represent value and growth
ﬁrms, respectively. According to Lakonishok et al. (1994) and Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001),
institutional investors prefer growth ﬁrms. Ferreira and Matos (2008), however, ﬁnd that U.S.
(foreign) institutional investors prefer value (growth) stocks.
(iii) Firm Market Turnover (TURN): We ﬁrst calculate the monthly turnover of a stock, which is equal
to its monthly volume (CRSP item: VOL) scaled by the ﬁrm’s shares outstanding for that month
(CRSP item: SHROUT). The annual ﬁgure is the average of the twelve monthly observations.16 According to Kaufmann et al. (2007, p. 3–4): “1. Voice and Accountability (VA), measures the extent to which a country’s
citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and
a free media. 2. Political Stability and Absence of Violence (PV), measures perceptions of the likelihood that the government will
be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including domestic violence and terrorism. 3. Government
Effectiveness (GE), measures the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence
from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s
commitment to such policies. 4. Regulatory Quality (RQ), measures the ability of the government to formulate and implement
sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. 5. Rule of Law (RL), measures the extent to
which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6. Control of Corruption (CC), measures the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state
by elites and private interests.”
17 Turnover is deﬁned as the average daily turnover by value in a year (Datastream item VA) divided by the average daily
market value of the country in that year.
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According to Almazan et al. (2005), liquid stocks are characterised by greater information ﬂows,
i.e., less information asymmetry, which allows institutional investors to better identify and
replace poor managers. Gompers andMetrick (2001) use size, price and turnover as determinants
of liquidity and also report a positive relation between institutional holdings andmarket liquidity.
(iv) Dividend Yield (DY): Dividend yield is the dividend per share (Compustat item: DVPSX-F) divided
by the ﬁscal year-end share price (Compustat item: PRCC-F). According to Dahlquist and
Robertsson (2001), foreign institutional investors invest in low dividend paying stocks because
of tax advantages.
(v) Return on Equity (ROE): Return on equity proxies for the proﬁtability of a ﬁrm and is calculated as
the ratio of net income (Compustat item: NI) to common equity (Compustat item: CEQ). Aggarwal
et al. (2005) ﬁnd that institutional holdings are positively related to the return on equity of the
ﬁrms in which institutions invest.
(vi) Leverage (LEV): Leverage is the ratio of debt in current liabilities (Compustat item: DLC) plus long-
term total debt (Compustat item: DLTT) to total assets (Compustat item: AT). Leverage determines
the investment choices of institutional investors in the following ways. Jensen and Meckling
(1976) argue that debt reduces a ﬁrm’s agency costs through increased monitoring by the
bondholders. If institutional ownership acts as a monitoring mechanism as well, one would
expect to see a negative relationship between leverage and institutional ownership due to the
substitution effect. Bathala et al. (1994) examine the role of institutional ownership on mana-
gerial ownership and debt policy. They indeed ﬁnd a negative relation between debt levels and
institutional ownership. In addition, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) argue that leverage is
a measure of a ﬁrm’s long-term ﬁnancial distress and ﬁnd that foreign investors avoid investing in
ﬁrms with high leverage.
(vii) Cash (CASH): Cash is the ratio of cash and short-term investments (Compustat item: CHE) to total
assets (Compustat item: AT). According to Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), institutional inves-
tors prefer to invest in ﬁrms with more cash, since these ﬁrms are associated with greater
ﬁnancial strength.
(viii) Directors Index (DINDEX): We follow Bushee et al. (2010) to create this index. DINDEX includes
ﬁve different dummy variables for: board size, percentage of independent directors, CEO-
chairman duality, presence of board interlocks, and attendance of board meetings. If the CEO
and chairman positions are combined, there are less checks and balances for the CEO, and
therefore less monitoring of his actions. We create a dummy variable (CEO) which is equal to one
if the positions are combined and zero otherwise. Interlocked directors are deﬁned as directors
who serve on each other’s boards and their presence on a board is considered an indicator of
weaker governance. Bushee et al. (2010, p. 11) explain the reasoning behind this idea as follows:
“Interlocked directors are considered indicative of weaker governance because such directors have
reciprocating relationships that create incentives to vote in ways that beneﬁt their counterparts and,
hence, themselves.” We create a variable (DLOCK) which is equal to one if there are any interlocks
on the board of directors and zero otherwise. If there is less attendance of board meetings, in
theory the monitoring of the management team will be less successful. Therefore, a low atten-
dance level is an indication of ineffective governance. We code a variable (DBAD) as one if any of
the directors miss 75 percent or more of the board meetings and zero otherwise. The proxy for
board size is the logarithm of the number of directors (LNDIR). If the board is large, it is assumed
that there are communication, coordination and decision-making problems. Next, since inde-
pendent directors’ careers do not depend heavily on the management team, they are considered
to be more effective monitors of a ﬁrm’s managers. To measure ineffective governance, we
calculate the percentage of directors that are dependent (PNID). DINDEX so far includes three
dummy variables, CEO, DLOCK and DBAD, and indicators for whether the ﬁrm has high levels of
LNDIR and PNID. We then split the distribution of LNDIR and PNID into high and low groups using
k-means cluster analysis. We create dummies for these two variables which are equal to one if
they are in the high group and zero otherwise. Therefore, we now have ﬁve dummy variables and
the DINDEX variable (the sum of these ﬁve dummy variables) takes values between zero and ﬁve.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940926A value of zero (ﬁve) indicates a board with the most effective (weakest) governance structure.
Bushee et al. (2010) ﬁnd a negative relation between institutional ownership and DINDEX.18
4.3. Methodology
To test our hypotheses we use the following two models:
FIOc;t ¼ a0 þ a1GQc;t þ azXf ;t þ 3 (1)
FIOc;t ¼ b0 þ b1GQdc;t  Df ;t þ bzXf ;t þ 3 (2)
The dependent variable (FIO) is the same in bothmodels. FIO is the percentage ownership of a ﬁrm’s
equity by foreign institutional investors domiciled in country c at time t. It is deﬁned as the ratio of the
shares held by the group of investors from that country, as reported at the last quarterly ﬁling before
the ﬁscal year-end, to the ﬁrm’s shares outstanding at ﬁscal year-end. GQ is the governance quality at
time t of the country (c) in which the investors are domiciled, measured as the average of the six KKM
governance indicators. D is the directors’ index (DINDEX) of ﬁrm f at time t, and GQd is a dummy
variable which allows us to split our sampled countries in each year into the Above-/Below-U.S. groups
in terms of governance quality (GQ). To conﬁrm our hypotheses, we expect the coefﬁcients a1 and b1 to
be negative and statistically signiﬁcant.
In both models, we use the same vector of ﬁrm-level control variables (X). These are ﬁrm size, book-
to-market ratio, dividend yield, turnover ratio, return on equity, leverage and cash level.
We use random-effect Tobit panel regressions to run our analyses. We opt for this model speciﬁ-
cation since our dependent variable is censored between zero and one. Tobit regressions allow us to
control for the substantial observed clustering of the dependent variable at values close to zero (left
clustering at 0.001% is pronounced). All speciﬁcations account for random unobserved ﬁrm effects. We
also add country ﬁxed effects into our models, to account for omitted time invariant country effects.19
In addition, we include year dummies to control for cross-sectional dependence, i.e., market-wide
effects that could inﬂuence the level of foreign institutional investment in the U.S. market.
In our robustness section, we also present alternative model speciﬁcations that control for the
inﬂuence of speciﬁc market-wide inﬂuences, such as the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in
2002, as well as ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive analyses
Table 1, Panel A, presents the fraction of shares held by foreign (FI) and domestic (DI) institutional
investors as well as overall institutional investment (TI) in the U.S. between the years 1999 and 2008.
We deﬁne institutional investment (II) as the fraction of a ﬁrm’s stocks that are owned by institu-
tional investors (Gompers and Metrick, 2001). Panel A illustrates that TI increases almost mono-
tonically over our sample period, reaching 70% in 2008. DI follows a similar pattern. Apart from
a decline in 2003, foreign institutional ownership levels increase during the sample period. By the
end of 2008, FI levels were twice of those that existed in 1999 (8% compared to 4%). This large
increase in FI conﬁrms that the level of foreign institutional holdings in the U.S. has grown signiﬁ-
cantly in recent years.
Table 1, Panel B, gives a breakdown of the different types of institutional investors who invest in the
U.S. The Thomson-Reuters database identiﬁes ﬁve types of institutional investors: Banks, Insurance
Companies, Investment Companies and their managers, Independent Investment Advisors and Others.18 Appendix Table A.3 provides descriptive statistics of the individual indicators, as well as the time-series changes in DINDEX.
19 Leuz et al. (2009) present several additional macroeconomic factors that might affect the level of foreign institutional
investment, for example the degree of market integration, transaction costs, language and restrictions on capital ﬂows. Even
though some of these factors change over time, arguably these changes are going to be small in our short time-series.
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Reuters has serious classiﬁcation errors in the S34 ﬁle (widely reported in the literature) with many
banks and independent investment advisors classiﬁed as Others from 1998 onwards. Because of this
classiﬁcation problem, we categorise institutional investors according to the Bushee et al. (2010)
classiﬁcation.20 Following Bushee et al., we are able to identify Public Pension Funds and therefore
separate them from the Others group. We also classify investment companies and independent
investment advisors into one group, which we call investment advisors (IA). We end up with ﬁve
different types of institutional investors: Banks, Insurance Companies, Investment Advisors, Public
Pension Funds and Others. According to Panel B, out of the ﬁve types of institutional investors,
Investment Advisors invest the most in U.S. ﬁrms. Their investment levels increase over the sample
period to reach 45% in 2008. Banks are the next largest investors after Investment Advisors, in terms of
holdings, reaching 15% in 2008. Insurance Companies and Public Pension Funds do not show
substantial increases in their holdings during the sample period. The holdings of Others quadruple over
our sample period.
Table 2, Panel A, presents summary statistics of the governance variables. The governance indicators
take values between 2.5 and 2.5. A value of 2.5 (2.5), indicates the highest (lowest) level of
governance quality. Most governance indicators have an average of one or above, indicating a high
quality of governance at the global level. Nevertheless, the standard deviation shows signiﬁcant
heterogeneity, both cross-sectionally and along the time-series.21 Table 2, Panel B, reports the
descriptive statistics for the ﬁrm-speciﬁc characteristics. We winsorise leverage, dividend yield and
return on equity at 1% (two tail) because these variables are highly skewed. The average ﬁrm in our
sample has a market value of $5.7 billion and a return on equity of 9%. The average log book-to-market
ratio is86%, leverage is at 23%, and turnover is almost 19%. Cash holdings account for 14% of the value
of total assets and the average directors’ index is 1.7, indicating an above average (i.e., 2.5) level of
internal governance quality. Ferreira and Matos (2008) report similar values for dividend yield,
leverage and cash ratio but a higher (lower) average return on equity (book-to-market ratio). Bushee
et al. (2010), report a similar average turnover ratio (15%).
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients for all the variables used in this study. At
a univariate level, FIO is negatively correlated with size which is consistent with prior literature
(Ferreira and Matos, 2008). Moreover, we ﬁnd a negative relation between foreign institutional
investment and DINDEX, indicating that institutional investors prefer to invest in ﬁrms with high-
quality corporate governance. Country governance (GQ) positively affects FIO in the U.S. market. This
is consistent with the familiarity argument. Still, caution should be exercised in interpreting this result.
We present detailed multivariate results in the next paragraphs which illustrate that the univariate
result is only part of the story. Finally, FIO is also positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with turnover
and book-to-market ratio. In contrast, FIO is negatively correlated with return on equity and moni-
toring cost.
The results presented in Table 3 show that multi-collinearity is not an issue in our subsequent
multivariate analyses. The only exception is the 50% correlation reported between the turnover
ratio and monitoring cost (MC), which is expected given that monitoring cost is deﬁned as 1/
Turnover (Almazan et al., 2005). So we exclude turnover from all model speciﬁcations that use MC
to alleviate concerns about multi-collinearity. Our results are not sensitive to this decision (unre-
ported results).
5.2. Foreign institutional ownership and country governance
We start by examining whether the governance quality of foreign institutional investors’ home
countries drives foreign institutional investment in theUnited States. Table 4, Panel A, presents the results
of random-effect Tobit regressions on our full sample where the dependent variable is FIO. Consistent
with our predictions, we ﬁnd a negative, signiﬁcant relation between GQ and foreign institutional20 The data for this classiﬁcation are available from http://acct3.wharton.upenn.edu/faculty/bushee/.
21 We provide the cross-sectional and time-series changes in GQ in Appendix Table A.2.
Table 2
Summary statistics.
Variable N Mean SD p25 p50 p75
Panel A: Descriptive statistics–Country governance variables
VA 128 1.21 0.45 1.02 1.36 1.52
PV 128 0.98 0.26 0.81 1.02 1.18
GE 128 1.65 0.37 1.34 1.74 1.94
RQ 128 1.49 0.31 1.25 1.53 1.73
RL 128 1.52 0.28 1.32 1.61 1.71
CC 128 1.71 0.41 1.35 1.77 2.07
GQ 128 1.43 0.25 1.19 1.47 1.62
Panel B: Descriptive statistics–Firm-speciﬁc characteristics
SIZE (billions) 17,011 5.736 14.325 0.500 1.255 3.928
DY 17,377 0.013 0.020 0.000 0.003 0.020
BM (log) 16,656 0.864 0.771 1.275 0.788 0.392
TURN 17,322 0.189 0.168 0.082 0.140 0.239
LEV 17,328 0.227 0.190 0.054 0.208 0.350
ROE 17,380 0.095 0.327 0.051 0.116 0.178
CASH 17,382 0.144 0.176 0.022 0.067 0.203
DINDEX 12,769 1.702 0.977 1.000 2.000 2.000
MC 17,322 9.752 8.658 4.178 7.168 12.172
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics for the KKM governance indicators used in the study. VA is Voice and Accountability;
PV is Political Stability and Absence of Violence; GE is Government Effectiveness; RQ is Regulatory quality; RL is Rule of Law; CC is
Control of Corruption. GQ is the average of the six KKM governance indicators. The six governance indicators are scaled from
2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better governance outcomes. Panel B reports the descriptive statistics for the
ﬁrm-level control variables used in this study. SIZE is ﬁrm size, deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-end market value of equity. BM is the
logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity. DY is dividend yield, deﬁned as the dividend
per share, divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is the return on
equity, deﬁned as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of cash and short-term
investment to total assets. TURN is the ﬁrm’s market turnover, which is equal to common shares traded divided by common
shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average of the twelve
monthly observations. DINDEX is the directors’ index, deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO
duality, number of board directors, the percentage of directors who are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and
attendance of board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly (well)-governed ﬁrm. MC is monitoring cost, which is
equal to 1/Turnover. Mean, median (p50), standard deviation (SD), 25th percentile (p25) and 75th percentile (p75) are reported.
N is the number of observations. Leverage, dividend yield, ﬁrm size and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails).
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ciatedwith higher investment levels in U.S. ﬁrms. This result is In linewith the ﬂight to quality argument.
In the second model, we insert a dummy variable that splits the institutional investors’ countries
into the Above-/Below-U.S. groups (GQd). The coefﬁcient of GQd is negative and highly signiﬁcant,
further conﬁrming the ﬂight to quality argument.
To test our second hypothesis, we interact GQd with each ﬁrm’s DINDEX (GQd*D). We ﬁnd a nega-
tive, signiﬁcant relation between GQd*D and FIO. This shows, consistent with the familiarity argument,
that foreign institutional investors who come from better (than the U.S.) -governed countries prefer to
invest in U.S. ﬁrms with high levels of internal governance. The coefﬁcient remains negative and
signiﬁcant evenwhenwe use an alternative proxy (MC) for corporate governance in our last model, i.e.,
foreign institutional investors from well-governed (better than the U.S.) countries invest in U.S. ﬁrms
with low monitoring costs.
The above results, even though signiﬁcant and robust, do not allow us to observe any heterogeneous
preferences within the Above-/Below-U.S. groups.
In Table 5, we address this limitation by running the initial test (the ﬁrst model speciﬁcation of Table
4) separately for the investors from countries from each group. We ﬁnd a negative (positive) and
signiﬁcant relationship between FIO and GQ in the above (below) group. Thus, among the foreign
investors who experience a higher quality of governance at home than exists in the U.S., it is those with
a lower GQ that invest more in U.S. ﬁrms. Meanwhile, for the below-U.S. group, foreign investors with
a higher GQ invest more in U.S. ﬁrms. In other words, investors from countries that are closest to the
U.S. (just above and below the U.S.), in terms of governance quality, invest the most in the U.S. market.
This is clear evidence of familiarity.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
FIO GQ DINDEX SIZE DY BM TURN LEV ROE CASH MC
FIO 1
GQ 0.105* 1
DINDEX 0.067* 0.021* 1
SIZE 0.130* 0.063* 0.247* 1
DY 0.001 0.032* 0.114* 0.089* 1
BM 0.048* 0.047* 0.016* 0.357* 0.238* 1
TURN 0.017* 0.019* 0.227* 0.078* 0.143* 0.011* 1
LEV 0.006 0.003 0.084* 0.017* 0.289* 0.069* 0.080* 1
ROE 0.019* 0.020* 0.034* 0.198* 0.016* 0.404* 0.092* 0.025* 1
CASH 0.007 0.002 0.184* 0.069* 0.293* 0.266* 0.327* 0.366* 0.021* 1
MC 0.031* 0.038* 0.260* 0.060* 0.149* 0.053* 0.504* 0.049* 0.033* 0.201* 1
This table presents the Pearson correlation coefﬁcients of the variables used in this study. FIO is the ﬁrm-level foreign insti-
tutional ownership in the United States. It aggregates the ﬁrm-level equity holdings of all investors domiciled in each country
(i.e., country-level holdings in each U.S. ﬁrm in our sample). GQ is the level of a country’s governance quality calculated as the
average of the six KKM governance indicators. DINDEX is the directors’ index deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on
information regarding CEO duality, the number of board directors, the percentage of directors who are not independent,
interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly (well)-governed
ﬁrm. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size, which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-end market value of equity. BM is the logarithm of the
ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity. DY is dividend yield, deﬁned as the dividend per share
divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is return on equity, deﬁned
as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of cash and short-term investment to total
assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover, which is equal to common shares traded divided by common shares outstanding. The
turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average of the twelve monthly observations. MC is
monitoring cost, which is equal to 1/Turnover. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails).
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(lower) governance quality than the U.S. belong to the Above-(Below-) U.S. group. Results in Table 4
provide evidence of ﬂight to quality by foreign institutional investors. Investment levels in the
average U.S. ﬁrm are higher from the Below-U.S. countries than from the Above-U.S. countries. But this
result is mainly driven by those countries whose governance levels are just below that of the U.S. In
other words, institutional investors from countries with signiﬁcantly different governance quality to
that of the U.S. do not invest in U.S. ﬁrms. We can only speculate on the reasons behind this. It seems
rational that these institutional investors face only moderate pressure from their end-users to invest in
better quality countries. These investors might also be faced with substantial barriers when trying to
invest in the U.S. (capital controls, informational barriers, etc). Finally, this result might also be
a manifestation that smaller countries, that are less likely to have institutional investors big enough to
achieve internationally diversiﬁed portfolios, do not invest in their governance quality.22 In contrast,
for the Above-U.S. group, it is clear that investors from countries with a signiﬁcantly better level of
governance quality than that of the U.S. have no incentive to invest in the U.S. For them, there are no
beneﬁts in investing in a country with a signiﬁcantly lower quality of governance that would justify the
additional costs associated with an investment abroad.
Appendices A.1 and A.2 show that amongst foreign institutional investors, the U.K. institutional
investors are the largest investors in U.S. ﬁrms and that the U.K. has higher level of governance quality
than the U.S. during our sample period. In order to test whether our results in Tables 4 and 5 are driven
only by the U.K. institutional investors, we exclude institutional investors domiciled in the U.K. from
our dataset and run our regressions again (Table 4, Panel B, and Table 5, model 2). Given that the U.K.
has higher governance quality than the U.S. for every year in our sample, it is meaningful to re-run, in
Table 5, only the Above-U.S. regression without U.K. domiciled institutional investors. The results22 According to La Porta et al. (2006) there is a positive relationship between the size of the country and its governance
quality. Thus, if a country is small in size, its governance quality should be low. These low governance quality countries have
small institutional investors that cannot achieve international diversiﬁcation. Because of this, we do not expect an investment
from these countries to the U.S.
Table 4
Determinants of foreign institutional ownership.
FIO (%)









































































































































































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,491 44,694 44,694 44,694 44,694
Chi2 82,698 76,531 76,942 77,829 10,846 10,898 6756 10,946
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit panel regressions on the determinants of foreign institutional ownership.
The dependent variable in all the regressions is the ﬁrm-level, foreign institutional ownership in the United States (FIO). It
measures the ﬁrm-level equity holdings of all investors domiciled in a given country (i.e., country-level holdings in each U.S. ﬁrm
in our sample). In Panel A (Panel B) we run the regressions on the full sample (excluding U.K. investors). GQ is the level of
a country’s governance quality, calculated as the average of the six KKM governance indicators. GQd is a dummy variable which
equals one if the governance quality of a country (GQ) in year t is greater than that of the U.S. in that year and zero otherwise.
DINDEX is the directors’ index, deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO duality, number of
board directors, the percentage of directors who are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of
board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly(well)-governed ﬁrm. GQd*D is equal to the country-level governance
quality dummy (GQd) multiplied by DINDEX. GQd*MC is equal to the country-level governance quality dummy (GQd) multiplied
byMC.MC is monitoring cost, which is equal to 1/Turnover. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size, which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-
end market value of equity. BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity. DY is
dividend yield, deﬁned as the dividend per share divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total
debt to total assets. ROE is return on equity deﬁned as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as
the ratio of cash and short-term investment to total assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover, which is equal to common shares
traded divided by common shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the
average of the twelve monthly observations. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails). Year
dummies (Year FE) and country dummies (Country FE) are included in all regressions. The numbers in brackets are p-values. *
indicates 10% signiﬁcance level, ** indicates 5% signiﬁcance level and *** indicates 1% signiﬁcance level. N is the number of
observations.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940930remain qualitatively similar. As expected, given the large holdings of U.K. investors, the coefﬁcients of
interest in our analyses become smaller. For example, the large GQ coefﬁcient in Table 4 Panel A
(5.480) drops to0.097 in Panel B. Similarly, the GQ coefﬁcient in the Above-U.S. regression of Table 5
(11.793) drops to1.554 whenwe exclude U.K. domiciled institutional investors. This highlights that
Table 5





Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
GQ 11.793*** [0.000] 1.554*** [0.000] 0.353*** [0.000]
DINDEX 0.044*** [0.000] 0.013*** [0.010] 0.008** [0.021]
SIZE (log) 0.043*** [0.000] 0.021*** [0.000] 0.014*** [0.000]
DY 1.742*** [0.000] 0.215 [0.381] 0.15 [0.416]
BM (log) 0.008 [0.602] 0.002 [0.789] 0.007 [0.167]
TURN 0.530*** [0.000] 0.184*** [0.000] 0.107*** [0.000]
LEV 0.096* [0.092] 0.018 [0.563] 0.063*** [0.003]
ROE 0.120*** [0.000] 0.028* [0.087] 0.013 [0.273]
CASH 0.045 [0.488] 0.048 [0.180] 0.01 [0.678]
Constant 18.345*** [0.000] 2.692*** [0.000] 0.580*** [0.000]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
N 41,054 28,908 18,437
Chi2 58,122 2080 1034
p-value 0 0 0
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit panel regressions on the investment preferences of foreign institutional
investors who come from countries with higher/lower governance quality than the United States. The dependent variable is still
FIO, i.e., the ﬁrm-level foreign institutional investment in the U.S. by each country represented in our sample, but now, for the
ABOVE-(BELOW-) U.S. models we only include foreign institutional ownership by institutional investors who come from
countries with higher (lower) governance quality than that of the U.S. Given that the foreign investment coming from the U.K.
accounts for the majority of foreign investment in the U.S., as well as the fact that the U.K. governance level is above that of the
U.S. for all years in our sample, we also run the Above-U.S. regression excluding the investment originating by institutional
investors domiciled in the U.K. This allows us to test the sensitivity of our results to this one country. GQ is the level of a country’s
governance quality calculated as the average of the six KKM governance indicators. DINDEX is the directors’ index deﬁned as in
Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO duality, number of board directors, the percentage of directors who
are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates
a poorly (well)-governed ﬁrm. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size, which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-end market value of equity.
BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity. DY is the dividend yield, deﬁned as
the dividend per share divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is
return on equity, deﬁned as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of cash and short-
term investment to total assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover, which is equal to common shares traded divided by common
shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average of the twelve
monthly observations. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails). Year dummies (Year FE)
and country dummies (Country FE) are included in all regressions. The numbers in brackets are p-values. * indicates 10%
signiﬁcance level, ** indicates 5% signiﬁcance level and *** indicates 1% signiﬁcance level. N is the number of observations.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940 931a large part of the economic signiﬁcance of our results is attributable to the U.K. investors. The fact that
all the coefﬁcients remain statistically signiﬁcant and with the predicted sign is an indication that our
results do not merely reﬂect the investment preferences of U.K. institutional investors.
6. Robustness tests
We run a series of tests to examine the robustness of our results. In Table 6 we show the results of
allowing heterogeneity in the monitoring activity of the foreign institutional investors. Foreign
investment levels in the U.S. could be driven by investors who cannot reduce their portfolios’ infor-
mation asymmetry at home since they do not monitor the investee ﬁrms’ management (non-moni-
toring investors). These investors could try to reduce their portfolios’ information asymmetry costs by
investing in a country with lower information asymmetry levels. If there are systematic differences in
the country of origin of these investors we could observe different results between monitoring and
non-monitoring institutional investors. Following Bushee et al. (2010), we classify banks, insurance
companies, corporate pension funds, university foundation endowments and others as grey (non-
monitoring) investors. In contrast, investment companies, independent investment advisors and
Fig. 1. Illustration of the main results reported in Tables 4 and 5.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940932public pension funds are classiﬁed as independent (monitoring) investors. Table 6, Panel A, shows that
there are no differences in the investment preferences of grey and independent foreign institutional
investors, with regard to the governance of the country inwhich they are investing. The ﬂight to quality
argument is valid for both types of investors. Interestingly, there are differences with respect to ﬁrm-
level investment. The familiarity argument holds only for the grey foreign institutional investors. This
is not a surprising result: given that grey investors do not engage in active monitoring of a ﬁrm’s
management team, they are likely to prefer to invest in more familiar ﬁrms so as to reduce information
asymmetry costs. As we mention in the previous Section, U.K. institutional investors are the largest
foreign investors in U.S. ﬁrms. So, it is important we test the robustness of this result after excluding
U.K. investors. In Table 6, Panel B, we report this analysis. The result for the independent institutional
investors is sensitive to the inclusion of U.K. institutional investors; once we exclude these investors it
becomes insigniﬁcant. Still, the coefﬁcients for grey institutional investors remain signiﬁcant
throughout. Thus, consistent with prior studies, our results appear to support the argument that
information asymmetry problems are strongly related to the decision to invest abroad.
In Table 7, we use alternative proxies for a country’s governance quality. Following the law and
ﬁnance literature (La Porta et al., 1998) we assume a positive relationship between a country’s
governance quality and the development of its main ﬁnancial market. We use market liquidity (market
turnover ratio) as a proxy for the development and depth of the ﬁnancial market. We introduce the
variable Td*D in the ﬁrst column. Td*D is an interaction term that includes a country-level turnover
dummy (Td) and DINDEX. Td is equal to one if the turnover ratio of a country’s market is greater than
the turnover ratio of the U.S. market in a given year and zero otherwise. We test whether foreign
institutional investors who have developed markets at home (high governance quality or less infor-
mation asymmetry) prefer to invest in high governance quality stocks (stocks with less information
asymmetry) in the U.S. Table 7 reports a negative relationship between Td*D and foreign institutional
investment. Thus, foreign institutional investors who experience less information asymmetry (high
governance quality or a developed market) in their home countries prefer to invest in stocks involving
less information asymmetry (those with high governance quality) in the U.S. This result is consistent
with the familiarity argument. The result becomes insigniﬁcant if, instead of DINDEX, we use moni-
toring cost (MC) as the proxy for a ﬁrm’s information asymmetry. However caution should be exercised
when interpreting the turnover results. Even though, as we mention above, the law and ﬁnance
Table 6
Investment preferences of grey and independent foreign institutional investors.
FIO (%)
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Excluding U.K. investors

































































































































































































































































Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
















Table 6 (continued )
FIO (%)
Panel A: Full sample Panel B: Excluding U.K. investors
Grey Ind. Grey Ind. Grey Ind. Grey Ind. Grey Ind. Grey Ind.
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 38,712 42,932 38,712 42,932 38,712 42,932 25,323 31,493 25,323 31,493 25,323 31,493
Chi2 71,974 2834 67,519 2822 68,222 2792 12,161 5502 8294 5158 8317 6201
p-value 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit panel regressions on the determinants of grey/independent foreign institutional ownership. The dependent variable in the regressions
is the ﬁrm-level foreign ownership by grey (independent) institutional investors in the United States. We classify banks, insurance companies and others (investment advisors/companies
and public pension funds) as grey (independent) investors. This measures ﬁrm-level equity holdings of grey/independent investors domiciled in each country (i.e., country-level holdings in
each U.S. ﬁrm in our sample). In Panel A (Panel B) we run the regressions on the full sample (excluding U.K. investors). GQ is the level of a country’s governance quality calculated as the
average of the six KKM governance indicators. GQd is a dummy variable which equals one if the governance quality of a country (GQ) in year t is greater than that of the U.S. in that year or
zero otherwise. DINDEX is the directors’ index deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO duality, number of board directors, the percentage of directors who
are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of boardmeetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly (well)-governed ﬁrm. GQd*D is equal to the country-level
governance quality dummy (GQd) multiplied by DINDEX. GQd*MC is equal to the country-level governance quality dummy (GQd) multiplied byMC.MC is monitoring cost, which is equal to
1/Turnover. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-end market value of equity. BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market
value of equity. DY is dividend yield, deﬁned as the dividend per share divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is return on
equity, deﬁned as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of cash and short-term investment to total assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover,
which is equal to common shares traded divided by common shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average of the twelve
monthly observations. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails). Year dummies (Year FE) and country dummies (Country FE) are included in all
























Td 0.439*** [0.000] 0.673*** [0.000]
MC 0.015*** [0.000] 0.016*** [0.000]
Hd 0.526*** [0.000] 0.594*** [0.000]
SIZE 0.024*** [0.000] 0.022*** [0.000] 0.017*** [0.001] 0.012** [0.028]
DY 1.094*** [0.004] 1.481*** [0.000] 0.835** [0.019] 1.218*** [0.001]
BM 0.015 [0.209] 0.011 [0.339] 0.013 [0.246] 0.007 [0.503]
TURN 0.408*** [0.000] 0.406*** [0.000]
LEV 0.06 [0.197] 0.057 [0.226] 0.063 [0.147] 0.062 [0.151]
ROE 0.097*** [0.000] 0.092*** [0.000] 0.088*** [0.000] 0.085*** [0.000]
CASH 0.012 [0.827] 0.034 [0.523] 0.01 [0.837] 0.049 [0.311]
DINDEX 0.027*** [0.001] 0.032*** [0.000] 0.052*** [0.000] 0.030*** [0.000]
Constant 1.642*** [0.000] 1.354*** [0.000] 1.638*** [0.000] 1.361*** [0.000]
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 52,767 52,767 58,665 58,665
Chi2 69,748 70,068 75,315 75,842
p-value 0 0 0 0
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit panel regressions on the determinants of foreign institutional ownership
using alternative proxies for a country’s governance quality. The dependent variable in all the regressions is the ﬁrm-level
foreign institutional ownership in the U.S. (FIO). This measures ﬁrm-level equity holdings of all investors domiciled in a given
country (i.e., country-level holdings in each U.S. ﬁrm in our sample). Td*D is an interaction term using the country-level turnover
dummy (Td) and DINDEX. Td is equal to one if the turnover ratio of a country in year t is greater than that of the U.S. in that year
and zero otherwise. DINDEX is the directors’ index, deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO
duality, number of board directors, the percentage of directors who are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and
attendance of board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly (well)-governed ﬁrm. Td*MC is an interaction term based
on the product of the country-level turnover dummy (Td) and monitoring cost (MC). MC is equal to 1/Turnover. Hd*D is the
interaction term based on the product of the U.S. holding dummy (Hd) and DINDEX. Hd*MC is the interaction term based on the
product of the U.S. holding dummy (Hd) and MC. Hd is equal to one if the level of U.S. holdings in a country is greater than the
median U.S. holdings for the cross-section of sampled countries in that year and zero otherwise. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size,
which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-endmarket value of equity. BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to
its market value of equity. DY is dividend yield, deﬁned as the dividend per share divided by the share price. LEV is leverage,
which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total assets. ROE is return on equity, deﬁned as net income divided by common equity.
CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of cash and short-term investment to total assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover,
which is equal to common shares traded divided by common shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly.
Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average of the twelve monthly observations. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are
winsorised at 1% (two tails). Year dummies (Year FE) and country dummies (Country FE) are included in all regressions. The
numbers in brackets are p-values. * indicates 10% signiﬁcance level, ** indicates 5% signiﬁcance level and *** indicates 1%
signiﬁcance level. N is the number of observations.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940 935literature has routinely used market liquidity as a proxy for market development, our research design
limits its usability. This is because the U.S. has one of the most developed markets and hence one of the
highest turnover ratios. This leaves us with a heavily unbalanced split between the Above- and Below-
U.S. turnover groups, with only six percent of our observations classiﬁed into the Above-U.S. group.
To address this issue, in the last two columns of Table 7, we show the results from following prior
studies on U.S. institutional investment abroad and classifying countries as more (less) developed
depending onwhether they have above (below) median U.S. investment levels.Hd is equal to one if the
level of U.S. holdings in a country is greater than the median U.S. holdings in the cross-section of
sampled countries in that year and zero otherwise.Hd*D is the interaction term based on the product of
the U.S. holdings dummy (Hd) and DINDEX. In order to create Hd, we obtain the level of U.S. portfolio
holdings of each country.23 We ﬁnd a negative relation between the interaction term and FIO further23 We retrieve the data on US holdings abroad from the Bureau of Economic Analysis reports, available at http://www.bea.gov/
international/di1usdbal.htm.
Table 8
Alternative speciﬁcations: SOX and ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
FIO (%)
RE Tobit RE Tobit RE Tobit FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS
GQ 5.499*** [0.000] 4.317*** [0.000]
GQd*D 0.196*** [0.000] 0.156*** [0.000]
GQd*MC 0.044*** [0.000] 0.044*** [0.000]
GQd 0.236*** [0.000] 0.201*** [0.000] 0.239*** [0.000] 0.280*** [0.000]
MC 0.005*** [0.010] 0.021*** [0.000]
SIZE 0.036*** [0.000] 0.029*** [0.000] 0.022*** [0.000] 0.060* [0.100] 0.056 [0.138] 0.058 [0.127]
DY 2.189*** [0.000] 2.652*** [0.000] 3.113*** [0.000] 0.212 [0.836] 0.358 [0.733] 0.062 [0.952]
BM 0.020* [0.064] 0.029*** [0.007] 0.032*** [0.003] 0.019 [0.565] 0.037 [0.274] 0.025 [0.460]
TURN 0.691*** [0.000] 0.790*** [0.000] 0.492*** [0.000] 0.520*** [0.000]
LEV 0.022 [0.606] 0.016 [0.717] 0.016 [0.712] 0.226 [0.181] 0.227 [0.195] 0.2 [0.251]
ROE 0.125*** [0.000] 0.138*** [0.000] 0.124*** [0.000] 0.047 [0.323] 0.035 [0.472] 0.021 [0.677]
CASH 0.085* [0.080] 0.125** [0.012] 0.053 [0.274] 0.174 [0.327] 0.155 [0.396] 0.212 [0.251]
DINDEX 0.064*** [0.000] 0.053*** [0.000] 0.072*** [0.000] 0.015 [0.287] 0.086*** [0.000] 0.013 [0.354]
SOX 0.339*** [0.000] 0.543*** [0.000] 0.482*** [0.000]
Constant 7.965*** [0.000] 1.190*** [0.000] 0.739*** [0.000] 5.342*** [0.000] 1.408*** [0.000] 0.764** [0.020]
Firm effect RE RE RE FE FE FE
Year FE No No No Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,491 59,491
Chi2 77,665 71,366 72,518 – – –
p-value 0 0 0 – – –
R2 – – – 0.132 0.101 0.105
F-stat – – – 49.48 162.48 54.35
p-value – – – 0 0 0
This table presents the results of random-effect Tobit and ﬁxed effect OLS panel regressions. The dependent variable in all the
regressions is the ﬁrm-level foreign institutional ownership in the U.S. (FIO). This measures ﬁrm-level equity holdings of all
investors domiciled in a given country (i.e., country-level holdings in each U.S. ﬁrm in our sample). GQ is the level of a country’s
governance quality, calculated as the average of the six KKM governance indicators. GQd is a dummy variable which equals one if
the governance quality of a country (GQ) in year t is greater than that of the U.S. in that year and zero otherwise. DINDEX is the
directors’ index, deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is based on information regarding CEO duality, number of board directors,
the percentage of directors who are not independent, interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of board meetings. A
value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly (well)-governed ﬁrm. GQd*D is equal to the country-level governance quality dummy (GQd)
multiplied by DINDEX. GQd*MC is equal to the country-level governance quality dummy (GQd) multiplied by MC. MC is moni-
toring cost, which is equal to 1/Turnover. SIZE is the logarithm of ﬁrm size, which is deﬁned as the ﬁscal year-endmarket value of
equity. BM is the logarithm of the ratio of the ﬁrm’s book value of equity to its market value of equity. DY is dividend yield,
deﬁned as the dividend per share divided by the share price. LEV is leverage, which is equal to the ratio of total debt to total
assets. ROE is return on equity, deﬁned as net income divided by common equity. CASH is cash holdings, deﬁned as the ratio of
cash and short-term investment to total assets. TURN is a ﬁrm’s market turnover, which is equal to common shares traded
divided by common shares outstanding. The turnover ratio is ﬁrst calculated monthly. Annual turnover is deﬁned as the average
of the twelve monthly observations. Leverage, dividend yield and return on equity are winsorised at 1% (two tails). SOX is
a dummy variable taking the value of one for the period after 2002 and zero otherwise. Year dummies (Year FE) and country
dummies (Country FE) are included in all regressions. The numbers in brackets are p-values. * indicates 10% signiﬁcance level, **
indicates 5% signiﬁcance level and *** indicates 1% signiﬁcance level. N is the number of observations.
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940936conﬁrming our results, i.e., investors frommore developed countries invest inwell-governed U.S. ﬁrms.
The result remains even if we use MC, instead of DINDEX, as our proxy for information asymmetry in
a ﬁrm.
We would like to highlight that in all our analyses we use country ﬁxed effects. These ﬁxed effects
capture the impact of omitted time invariant country characteristics, such as language, educational
and cultural bonds, closeness/familiarity, etc. However, there are macroeconomic factors that might
change over time, in which case their impact won’t be captured by our country ﬁxed effects. Still, our
time-series is relatively short, compared to the typical periods examined in macroeconomics. As we
argue in footnote 19, most of the macro factors will change little over the 10 years we examine. In
order to alleviate concerns that our results are driven by omitted macro effects, we construct some of
N. Abdioglu et al. / Journal of International Money and Finance 32 (2013) 916–940 937the variables used in the extant literature and re-estimate our main models presented in Tables 4 and
5 (untabulated results). In particular, instead of the country dummies we use 3 country-speciﬁc
variables in all speciﬁcations: GDPPC is the gross domestic product per capita (Chan et al., 2005);
DISTANCE is a measure of geographical distance which captures the bilateral distance of capital cities
of countries, and is used as a proxy for closeness (Frankel et al., 1995); MCAPGDP is the relative size of
the stock market of each country, measured by the stock market capitalization as a percentage of the
country’s GDP and proxies for stock market development (Forbes, 2010).24 Our results remain largely
unchanged.
Finally, we present our results using alternative model speciﬁcations. First, instead of controlling for
time trends (market-wide effects) using year dummies, we control for the effect of the enactment of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. SOX imposes higher disclosure andmore accountability on ﬁrms
listed in the U.S. exchanges. Therefore, it is expected to increase the internal corporate governance
quality of U.S. ﬁrms. We re-run our results using a SOX dummy that takes the value of one (zero) post-
(pre-) SOX, instead of the year dummies. Table 8, columns 1–3, reports the results of this speciﬁcation.
We obtain results consistent with the prior analyses. Second, the use of Tobit models forces us to
control for random unobserved ﬁrm effects. To test the impact of the random ﬁrm effects assumption,
we run our analysis using OLS regressions. This allows us to assume ﬁxed ﬁrm effects, but at the cost of
using a suboptimal regression technique (given the censoring of the dependent variable, which makes
it left-clustered). The results remain unchanged.7. Conclusion
The main contribution of this paper lies in the examination of the inﬂuence of the foreigners’
country-level governance quality on their investment preferences when they invest in the United
States. We reconcile prior evidence in the literature by presenting results consistent with both
the familiarity and ﬂight to quality arguments. Institutional investors from countries with
governance quality similar to that of the U.S. invest more in U.S. ﬁrms. But investors from
countries with governance quality just below (just above) that of the U.S. invest more (less) in
comparison.
We also present evidence that governance quality at home also affects ﬁrm-level investment
preferences of foreign investors. Our results indicate that foreign institutional investors from high
governance quality (low information asymmetry) countries invest in U.S. ﬁrms with high corporate
governance quality (less information asymmetry). Our evidence supports the familiarity argument, and
highlights information asymmetry costs as a cause of familiarity, particularly for non-U.K. investors.
Our ﬁndings, both at the country and ﬁrm level are robust to the use of different variable and model
speciﬁcations.
In sum, we contribute to the foreign institutional investment literature by further investigating the
role of home governance. Our research design allows us to explore the heterogeneous preferences of
foreign institutional investors depending on the distance of their countries’ governance quality from
that of the United States. This helps us to reconcile contradictory evidence presented in prior studies on
the validity of the ﬂight to quality and familiarity arguments.Acknowledgements
We would like to thank an anonymous referee, the participants of the FMA European Conference
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suggestions on earlier drafts of the paper. All errors are our responsibility.24 In additional tests, we have also used LANGUAGE, that is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for English speaking
countries, zero otherwise, and CAPITAL CONTROL, which is a measure of “freedom” investors enjoy in a capital market. These
two variables are highly correlated with GDPPC and DISTANCE, so we cannot use them in the same model.
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Ownership by foreign institutional investor’s country of domicile.
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
United Kingdom 2.848% 2.950% 3.506% 3.571% 1.608% 5.187% 5.329% 5.317% 5.891% 6.307%
Australia 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.007%
Bahamas 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.001% 0.002% 0.008%
Barbados 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Belgium 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.024%
Bermuda 0.062% 0.085% 0.110% 0.137% 0.143% 0.130% 0.137% 0.158% 0.138% 0.055%
Canada 0.879% 0.573% 0.651% 0.406% 0.458% 0.355% 0.407% 0.520% 0.641% 0.701%
Cayman islands 0.002% 0.002% 0.003% 0.003% 0.001% 0.001% 0.002% 0.008% 0.013% 0.003%
Denmark 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.028% 0.056% 0.033% 0.040% 0.044% 0.040% 0.037%
France 0.015% 0.016% 0.021% 0.019% 0.020% 0.022% 0.074% 0.151% 0.195% 0.152%
Germany 0.006% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.135% 0.153% 0.044% 0.015%
Ireland (Republic of) 0.023% 0.031% 0.038% 0.050% 0.068% 0.073% 0.054% 0.028% 0.044% 0.051%
Japan 0.105% 0.142% 0.123% 0.150% 0.140% 0.148% 0.178% 0.196% 0.139% 0.167%
Netherlands 0.028% 0.033% 0.092% 0.125% 0.179% 0.196% 0.179% 0.196% 0.246% 0.381%
Norway 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.093% 0.255% 0.439%
Singapore 0.013% 0.019% 0.030% 0.067% 0.073% 0.068% 0.063% 0.064% 0.057% 0.043%
Switzerland 0.033% 0.037% 0.051% 0.066% 0.062% 0.049% 0.064% 0.071% 0.048% 0.032%
Taiwan 0.000% 0.062% 0.079% 0.006% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000%
Total 4% 4% 5% 5% 3% 6% 7% 7% 8% 8%
This table shows the foreign institutional investments in the U.S. between 1999 and 2008. We report the percentage of shares
held by all foreign institutional investors domiciled in each country. The investment levels are reported for the constituent ﬁrms
of the S&P 1500 index.Table A.2
Time-series changes in governance quality (GQ) by country.
Country 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Australia 1.60 1.63 1.63 1.54 1.57 1.67 1.56 1.55 1.58 1.62
Bahamas 1.17 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.15 1.15 1.14 1.10 1.10 1.12
Barbados 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.26 1.21 1.18 1.20 1.11 1.17 1.18
Belgium 1.30 1.36 1.36 1.44 1.40 1.36 1.28 1.27 1.27 1.21
Bermuda 1.19 1.13 1.13 1.14 1.14 1.14 1.07 1.06 1.05 1.07
Canada 1.64 1.62 1.62 1.64 1.63 1.61 1.53 1.59 1.57 1.60
Cayman islands 1.36 1.38 1.38 1.39 1.15 1.20 1.16 1.17 1.17 1.07
Denmark 1.74 1.75 1.75 1.81 1.80 1.85 1.77 1.82 1.84 1.82
France 1.15 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.23 1.31 1.26 1.25 1.22 1.24
Germany 1.55 1.60 1.60 1.56 1.44 1.45 1.46 1.50 1.49 1.43
Ireland (Republic of) 1.53 1.53 1.53 1.50 1.46 1.45 1.52 1.56 1.56 1.57
Japan 1.04 1.06 1.06 0.96 1.12 1.17 1.16 1.24 1.18 1.16
Netherlands 1.81 1.82 1.82 1.74 1.69 1.70 1.63 1.60 1.62 1.61
Norway 1.73 1.61 1.61 1.69 1.65 1.72 1.64 1.66 1.64 1.64
Singapore 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.44 1.41 1.49 1.43 1.40 1.45 1.51
Switzerland 1.71 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.69 1.74 1.64 1.68 1.71 1.70
Taiwan 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.84 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.78 0.73 0.79
United kingdom 1.64 1.60 1.60 1.55 1.48 1.52 1.42 1.50 1.45 1.40
United states 1.44 1.52 1.52 1.40 1.34 1.33 1.24 1.25 1.22 1.28
This table reports the time-series changes in GQ for all countries examined in this study. GQ is the average of the six KKM
governance indicators. The six governance indicators are scaled from 2.5 to 2.5, with higher values corresponding to better
governance outcomes.
Table A.3
Details of the directors’ index (DINDEX).
DINDEX scores
0 1 2 3 4 5
Panel A: Average values per governance indicator
Variable
CEO 0 0.67 0.91 0.95 0.99 1
LNDIR 0 0.13 0.6 0.82 0.95 1
PNID 0 0.16 0.4 0.71 0.93 1
DLOCK 0 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.47 1
DBAD 0 0.02 0.08 0.38 0.66 1
Obs. 1216 4427 4940 1928 438 68
DINDEX 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Panel B: Time-series changes in DINDEX
0 55 52 63 61 92 115 138 154 261 225
4% 4% 5% 5% 7% 8% 10% 11% 22% 18%
1 286 332 364 404 442 486 527 507 532 547
22% 26% 29% 31% 33% 36% 38% 38% 45% 43%
2 510 500 530 517 532 536 559 496 336 424
40% 39% 42% 40% 40% 40% 41% 37% 28% 33%
3 297 295 306 229 207 173 122 162 57 80
23% 23% 24% 18% 16% 13% 9% 12% 5% 6%
4 103 77 58 68 46 39 21 17 7 2
8% 6% 5% 5% 3% 3% 2% 1% 1% 0%
5 20 15 12 8 2 4 3 4 0 0
2% 1% 1% 1% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Obs. 1271 1271 1270 1287 1321 1353 1370 1340 1193 1278
This table presents the descriptive statistics for the directors’ index (DINDEX). DINDEX is deﬁned as in Bushee et al. (2010). It is
based on information regarding CEO duality, number of board directors, the percentage of directors who are not independent,
interlocks on the board of directors and attendance of board meetings. A value of ﬁve (one) indicates a poorly(well)-governed
ﬁrm. Panel A shows the average value of each governance indicator for each level of DINDEX. Panel B shows the time-series
changes in DINDEX. The numbers show the number of ﬁrms with each score. The percentages are calculated by scaling the
number of ﬁrms by the total observations per year. CEO measures CEO duality. It is equal to one if the positions of CEO and
Chairman are combined and zero otherwise. LNDIR is the logarithm of the number of directors. PNID is the percentage of
directors that are not independent. To form these indicators, we split the distribution of LNDIR and PNID into high and low
groups using k-means cluster analysis. For the high (low) group the variable equals one (zero). DLOCK is equal to one if there are
any interlocks on the board of directors and zero otherwise.DBAD signiﬁes poor attendance and equals one if any directormisses
75% or more of the board meetings and zero otherwise.
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